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If the agent's preference relation satises a strict monotonicity condition in common
agency under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in
the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of all
equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are
allowed.
1 Introduction
In common agency problems, competing principals try to control a privately-informed agent's
choice. Each principal may oer a single incentive contract that species the principal's
action as a function of the part of the agent's choice that is contractible by the principal.
For example, each principal may specify how much the agent needs to pay for each bundle of
goods she buys from the principal or how much the principal will pay the agent as a function
of the eort the agent exerts on the principal's tasks and etc.
Alternatively, and more generally, each principal may oer a menu of contracts and let
the agent pick one of the contracts and then choose her eort. Theorems 1 and 3 in Peters
(2003) showed that if the \no-externalities" condition is satised, then, under the complete
information, the set of pure-strategy equilibrium payos in the menu game in which menus of
contracts are allowed coincides with the set of pure-strategy equilibrium payos in the single
contract game in which each principal is allowed to oer only a single contract (i.e., take-it-
or-leave it oer without negotiation). The \no externalities" condition (Peters 2003, 2007)
is satised if (i) each principal's utility only depends on his own action and the agent's eort
and type, and (ii) conditional on the part of the agent's eort that principal j can contract
on, the agent has a weak preference ordering over principal j's actions that is independent
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1of her payo type, the part of her eort that principal j cannot contract on, and the other
principals' actions.
Peters and Troncoso Valverde (2009) pointed out that the role of mixed strategies has
been widely recognized in the literature on common agency and hence it is important to
deal with randomization. For example, a seller (principal) may use a mixed-strategy for his
trading mechanism oer in order to conceal his mechanism from competing sellers. In this
case, competing sellers cannot know the seller's terms of trade if they ask agents only about
their payo types.
We extend the result in Peters (2003, 2007) to all equilibria including mixed-strategy
equilibria in the asymmetric information case in which the agent's payo type is her own
private information. For this purpose, we introduce the condition for the agent's preferences;
strict monotonicity over each principal's actions. This condition is satised if, conditional on
the part of the agent's eort that principal j can contract on, the agent has a strict preference
ordering over principal j's actions that is independent of her payo type, the part of her
eort that principal j cannot contract on, and the other principals' actions. Therefore, it is
a stronger form of the second part in the \no-externalities" condition but it is not nested
into the \no-externalities" condition because the rst part is not required.
Formally, we show that the strict monotonicity for the agent's preferences alone ensures
that under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu
game coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game. As
the result in Peters holds for both public common agency and private common agency, the
result is also established for both public common agency and private common agency.1
Both the second part in the \no-externalities" condition and our strict monotonicity are
satised in most cases where each principal's action is monetary transfer between him and the
agent and they do not require the quasilinearity or additive separability. Later we highlight
the relationship between the \no-externalities" condition and the strict monotonicity of the
agent's preferences over each principal's actions and explain why the rst part of the \no-
externalities" condition is not needed.
2 Model
Let us explain the general structure for common agency models. There are a set of principals,
J  f1; ;Jg; and a single agent. The agent has private information about her preferences.
This information is parameterized by an element, called a (payo) type, in a set 
. Principals
do not know the true type but they share a common prior belief that the agent's type follows
a probability distribution F on 
. Therefore, there is the asymmetric information on the
agent's type. The agent can take an eort e from a set E. Each principal j can take an action
yj from a set Yj. We assume that the sets E and Yj are both compact metric spaces. If the
agent of type ! takes an eort e and the array of actions that principals take is (y1;:::;yJ);
the agent's payo is u(y1;:::;yJ;e;!) 2 R and principal j's payo is vj(y1;:::;yJ;e;!) 2 R:
1In public common agency, the whole eort of the agent is contractible between the agent and a principal.
In private common agency, only a part of the agent's eort is contractible between the agent and a principal.
2An incentive contract aj: E ! Yj that principal j oers to the agent species his action
as a function of the part of the agent's eort that is contractible between them. Following
Peters (2003), let Ej be a collection of measurable equivalence classes, whose union is E such
that principal j is constrained to respond to each eort in the same equivalence class the
same way. It implies that, for any incentive function aj, aj(e) = aj(e0) if e and e0 belongs to
the same equivalence class, say ^ e: i.e., e;e0 2 ^ e.
The set of feasible incentive contracts for principal j is therefore dened as Aj  faj 2
Aj: aj is Ej-measurableg: Aj diers in the part of the agent's eort that is contractible
between principal j and the agent. Let A  J
k=1Ak: In public common agency (e.g. lob-
bying), principal j (lobbyist) can make his action contingent on the whole eort (policy)
taken by the agent (policy maker). In this case, each eort e is an equivalence class and
any equivalence class is a singleton. In private common agency (e.g., private good trading),
an eort e chosen by the agent (buyer) is decomposed into J components, e = [e1;:::;eJ],
and principal j (seller) can make his action (monetary transfer) contingent on only the jth
component (quantity or quality), ej, of the agent action. In this case, an equivalence class
is the set of the agent's eorts that have the same jth component and it makes an incentive
contract aj eectively specify principal j's action only conditional on ej.
Principals compete with each other by oering the agent menus of incentive contracts. A
menu for principal j is a mapping j: Aj ! Aj such that either aj = j(aj) or  aj = j(aj)
for some  aj 2 Aj. The interpretation is that the agent can name the incentive contract that
she wants and if it belongs to the menu j gets it. A principal may oer a more complex
mechanism in which the incentive contract is determined by the agent's message. However,
there is no loss of generality to focus on menus in common agency due to Peters (2001)
because the set of all equilibrium payos in the complex mechanism game is the same as the
set of all equilibrium payos in the menu game. Let  
j be the set of all menus available for
principal j: and    J
k=1 
k:
The menu game in common agency starts when each principal j simultaneously oers
a menu from  
j: After seeing a prole of menus  = [1; ;I] 2  ; the agent names an
incentive contract for each principal and takes her eort from E. The agent's eort then
determines principals' actions given the incentive functions that the agent gets. Finally,
payos are realized. The agent's continuation strategy is a mapping c:  
 ! (AE):
The continuation strategy c constitutes a continuation equilibrium if the randomization




where j(aj) is the incentive contract that agent i gets when she names the contract aj and
j(aj)(e) is principal j's action conditional on the contractible part of the eort e that the
agent chooses. Then, the continuation equilibrium c species the normal form game for










3Let j 2 ( 
j) be principal j's strategy. An equilibrium relative to   is an array of
randomization [
1;:::;
J] and a continuation equilibrium c such that [
1;:::;
J] is a Nash
equilibrium for the normal form game dened by c:
3 Main Result
In the single contract game, each principal j is only allowed to oer an incentive contract in
Aj: Given an array of incentive contracts oered by principals, the agent simply makes her
eort choice. An incentive contract aj can be interested as a degenerate menu because it is
equivalent to the menu j with aj = j(a0
j) for all a0
j: Because the set of degenerate menus
is a strict subset of  
j; the single contract game restricts the principal's strategy space. It
raises two concerns for the single contract game. First, the equilibrium in the single contract
game may disappear once a principal is allowed to oer non-degenerate menus. Second,
the single contract game may not generate all equilibrium allocations that could have been
generated by the menu game.
Theorem 1 in Peters (2003) shows that under the complete information, any pure-strategy
equilibrium in the single contract game continues to be an equilibrium in the menu game.
Theorem 3 in Peters (2003) states as follows. Suppose that the \no-externalities" condition
holds. Then, under the complete information, payos associated with any pure-strategy
equilibrium in the menu game are supported by a pure-strategy equilibrium in the single
contract game. Therefore, the theorems imply that the \no-externalities" condition ensures
that under the complete information, the set of pure-strategy equilibria in the single-contract
game coincides with the set of pure-strategy equilibria. The \no-externalities" condition in
Peters (2003, 2007) is stated as follows:
D1. For each j 2 J, there exists a function  vj : Yj  E  
 ! R such that for all
(y1;:::;yJ) 2 J
k=1Yk; all e 2 E; and all ! 2 

vj(y1;:::;yJ;e;!) =  vj(yj;e;!)
D2. For each j 2 J, each ^ e 2 Ej, each closed subset B




j : u(yj;y j;e;!)  u(y
0







is the same for all (y j;e;!) 2 Y j  ^ e  
.
Property D1 states that principal j's payo is independent of the actions chosen by
the other principals. Property D2 states that conditional on the part of the agent's eort
that principal j can contract on, the agent has a weak preference ordering over principal
j's actions that is independent of her payo type, the part of her eort that principal j
cannot contract on, and the other principals' actions. Peters (2003) showed that the agent's
weak preference ordering alone is not sucient in order to ensure that no additional (pure-
strategy) equilibrium can be emerged if principals are allowed to oer menus. Let us take
his example under the complete information where the agent has no eort and each of two
4principals has choices between two actions; fa1;b1g for principal 1 and fa2;b2g for principal
2.2 The tuple of three numbers in the cell below indicates payos for principal 1, principal




In this example, the agent has a weak preference ordering over each principal's actions that
is independent of the other principal's action: For the agent, a1 is at least as good as b1
regardless of principal 2's action and a2 is at least as good as b2 regardless of principal 1's
action. However, property D1 is not satised.
There is a unique (pure-strategy) equilibrium when each principal i is restricted to oer
ai or bi but not the menu of fai;big: In the unique equilibrium, principal 1 oers b1 and
principal 2 oers b2. If we expand the game so that each principal can oer the menu of two
actions, then we have a continuum of new equilibria. Suppose that each principal i oers
the menu of fai;big. Then the agent may randomize with probability q between the two o
diagonal outcomes when she makes her choice from the menus. This supports payos for
principals anywhere between 1 and 2. If principal i deviates to ai; then the agent chooses aj
from the other principal's menu and principal i's payo is zero. If principal i deviates to bi;
then the agent chooses aj to induce the payo of one for principal i:
Let us perturb the payo slightly with a small " > 0 as follows:
a2 b2
a1 0;0;1 + " 2;1;1
b1 1;2;1 3;3;0
In this case, the agent has a strict preference ordering over each principal's actions that is
independent of the other principal's action: The agent strictly prefers a1 to b1 regardless of
principal 2's action and she also strictly prefers a2 to b2 regardless of principal 1's action.
Therefore, if principal i oers the menu of fai;big, the agent will always choose ai regardless
of the other principal's action. Therefore, bi in the menu fai;big will be never chosen in any
continuation equilibrium and, even without property D1, there is no additional equilibrium
in the menu game that cannot be generated by a take-it-or-leave-it-oer game.
This intuition can be extended to the case with the agent's eort under the asymmetric
information. For this purpose, we dene the strict monotonicity of the agent's preferences in
each principal's action. In words, the agent's preferences are strictly monotone if, conditional
on the part of the agent's eort that principal j can contract on, the agent has a strict
preference ordering over principal j's actions that is independent of her payo type, the part
of her eort that principal j cannot contract on, and the other principals' actions:
2As Peck (1997) showed, we can similarly construct an example which shows that without restrictions
on preferences, a menu game may generate an additional mixed-strategy equilibrium allocation that cannot
be generated by a take-it-or-leave-oer game. However, we take the example in Peters (2003) that shows a
menu game generates an additional (pure-strategy) equilibrium allocation. The reason is that it can clearly
illustrate the relationship between the \no-externalities" condition and our strict monotonicity of the agent's
preferences over each principal's action.
5Denition 1 The agent's preferences are strictly monotone in each principal's action if,
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0









is the same for all (y j;e;!) 2 Y j  ^ e  
.
The only dierence between property D2 in the \no-externalities" condition and our strict
monotonicity is that the weak inequality in (1) is replaced with the strict inequality as shown
in (2). All the examples for the agent's preferences in Peters (2003) that satisfy property
D2 also satisfy our strict monotonicity: Both property D2 and the strict monotonicity (a
stronger version of D2) are satised in most cases where each principal j's action is monetary
transfer between him and the agent. For example, assume that the agent is the buyer who




(y1 + y2)2 ; (3)
where ej is the quantity of the good that the buyer buys from seller j and yj is the transfer
to seller j: Seller j receives transfer only conditional on the quantity of the good ej that
he sells to the buyer, so, for each ej, the equivalence class is f(ej;ei) : ei 2 R+g. Because,
conditional on each ej; the buyer strictly prefers a less transfer to seller j regardless of ei; yi;
and !; the strict monotonicity is satised for the agent's preferences.
Both property D2 in the \no-externalities" condition and our strict monotonicity do not
require the quasilinearity or the separability and genericity in Attar et al. (2008). Attar et al.
(2008) showed that if the separability and genericity are satised for the agent's preferences,
then the set of all equilibrium allocations in complex mechanisms is the set of all equilibrium
allocations in standard direct mechanisms in the environment with nite action space. Their
separability requires that the agent has the strict preference ordering over each principal's
action yj that is independent of her whole eort e and the other principals' actions y j.
Formally the separability in Attar et al. (2008) requires that if the agent of type ! strictly
prefers yj to y0
j given (y j;e); then she also strictly prefers yj to y0
j given any other (y0
 j;e0):
The genericity requires that given any (yj;!) 2 Yj  
, u(yj;y j;e;!) 6= u(yj;y0
 j;e0;!) for
any (y j;e);(y0
 j;e0) 2 Y j  E: The separability in Attar et al. (2008) is not weaker nor
stronger than property D2 of the \no-externalities" condition and the strict monotonicity
in our paper3, but Pavan and Calzolari (2010) showed that the separability is restrictive in
most common agency problems involving monetary transfer. One advantage of property D2
3The separability requires that the agent's preferences over each principal j's action to be independent
of the agent's whole eort e but property D2 in the \no-externalities" condition and our strict monotonicity
require them to be independent of the particular eort the agent chooses in a given equivalence class for
principal j (in other words, the part of eort that principal j cannot contract on). On the other hand,
property D2 in the \no-externalities" condition and our strict monotonicity requires the agent's preferences
over each principal's action be independent of the agent's type while such a dependence is allowed in the
separability.
6in the \no-externalities" condition and our strict monotonicity (a stronger version of D2) is
that they are satised in most cases where each principal's action is monetary transfer.
With the strict monotonicity, we extend the results in Peters (2003) for all equilibrium
allocations under the asymmetric information as follows.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the agent's preferences are strictly monotone in each principal's
action. Then, under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations rel-
ative to the single contract game is the same as the set of all equilibrium allocations in the
menu game.
Note that Theorem 1 is established by assuming that for each principal j; the sets of
feasible contracts in the single contract game and the menu games are all Aj and it is Ej-
measurable. Because Aj is Ej-measurable, in public common agency it includes all incentive
contracts that specify principal j's action conditional on the agent's eort e as a whole. In
private common agency, principal j can specify his action conditional only on the jth com-
ponent ej of the agent's eort. Therefore, the Ej-measurable Aj includes only those incentive
contracts that eectively specify principal j's action conditional on ej only. Therefore, as the
result in Peters (2003) holds for both public common agency and private common agency,
Theorem 1 is also established for both public common agency and private common agency.
Appendix includes omitted technical details including the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX
We rst develop a few notations for the proof of Theorem 1. For any j 2 J; any j 2  
j;
and any ^ e 2 Ej dene Bj(^ e;j) as
Bj(^ e;j)  fyj 2 Yj: yj = j(aj)(e) for all aj 2 Aj and any e 2 ^ eg: (4)
j(aj) is the incentive function that principal j assigns when the agent names the incentive
contract aj so that Bj(^ e;j) is the set of principal j's actions that the agent can induce when
she takes any eort e in an equivalence class ^ e. For all j 2 J; all j 2  
j, and all e 2 E; let
 j(j)(e)  argmax
yj2Bj(^ e;j)
u(yj;y j;e;!) (5)
be principal j's action that maximizes the agent's payo among all actions in Bj(^ e;j) when
she takes e, where ^ e in (5) is the equivalence class that satises e 2 ^ e. When the agent's
preference relation is strictly monotone in each principal's action,  j(j)(e) is a singleton
for all e 2 E so that  j(j) itself becomes an incentive contract that species principal j's
action as a function of the part of the agent's eort that he can contract on.
For technical simplicity, we assume that  j(j)(e) is non-empty for all j 2 J, all e 2 E,
and all j 2  
j
Lemma 1 Suppose that the agent's preference relation is strictly monotone in each princi-
pal's action. For any continuation equilibrium c relative to  , let c
a(e;;!) denote the prob-
ability distribution over any array of incentive contracts conditional on (e;;!) 2 E 
.
Then any (a1;:::;aJ) in the support of c
a(e;;!) satises
j(aj)(e) =  j(j)(e) (6)
for all (e;;!) 2 E     
 and all j 2 J.
7Proof. Let  = [1;:::;J] be the prole of menus that principals oer. Given a continuation
equilibrium c relative to  , let c
aj(e;;!) be the marginal probability distribution on Aj
conditional on (e;;!): Suppose that the agent's preference relation is strictly monotone
in each principal's action. Given j; the set of principal j's actions, Bj(^ e;j) dened in
(4), that the agent can induce depends on eort e that she takes because e subsequently
determines ^ e. Once Bj(^ e;j) is determined, the agent will always choose a message that
leads to  j(j)(e) 2 Bj(^ e;j) because of the strict monotonicity of the agent's preference
relation. It implies that given e and j; any aj in the support of c
aj(e;j; j;!) must satisfy
(6) regardless of  j and !. Therefore, any (a1;:::;aJ) in the support of c
aj(e;;!) satises
(6) for all (e;;!) 2 E     
 and all j 2 J.
Proof of Theorem 1. First start with an equilibrium [
1;:::;
J;c] relative to  .
The equilibrium prole of strategies [
1;:::;
J;c] induces the probability distribution over
E  Y conditional on the agent's type. Let : 
 ! (E  Y ) specify these conditional
distributions associated the equilibrium [
1;:::;
J;c]. In the mechanism design literature,
 is called a social choice function and it characterizes the allocation in the economy.
For each j 2 J, let ~ j be the probability measure over Aj that is induced by 
j through
the map  j: It is the mixed strategy that principal j will use in the single contract game
(i.e., the game relative to A). Let  
 1
j be the inverse correspondence of  j. For any aj 2 Aj;






j (aj) \ supp 
j if  
 1





where   
 1
j (aj) is an arbitrary menu in  
 1
j (aj). For any a = [a1;:::;aJ] 2 A; let D(a) =
J
k=1Dk(ak)   :
From the equilibrium strategy prole [
1;:::;
J;c] relative to  , we can derive a joint
probability distribution b(D;!) on A  E for all D    and all ! 2 
. Let ba(e;D;!) be
the probability distribution on A conditional on (e;D;!) that b(D;!) induces. Let be(D;!)
be the marginal probability distribution on E that b(D;!) induces. Construct the agent's
continuation strategy ~ c : A  
 ! (E) relative to A as
~ c(a;!) = be(D(a);!) (7)
for all (a;!) 2 A
. We will show that [~ 1;:::; ~ J;~ c] is an equilibrium relative to A. Note
that Lemma 1 implies that any (a1;:::;aJ) in the support of ba(e;D(a);!) induces the same
prole of principals' actions, [a1(e);:::;aJ(e)] 2 Y . Therefore, (7) ensures that the social
choice function : 
 ! (E Y ) associated with the equilibrium [
1;:::;
J;c] relative to
  is the same as the social choice function ~ : 
 ! (E Y ) associated with [~ 1;:::; ~ J;~ c]
relative to A.
Given  2 D(a) and her payo type ! 2 








8Any e in the support of be(D(a);!) satises (8) because the joint probability distribution
b(D(a);!) is derived from the continuation equilibrium c relative to  . Therefore, (7)
implies that ~ c is a continuation equilibrium relative to A.
We only need to show that ~ j is a best response for principal j given ~  j relative to A.




























j(aj;a j;~ c) using ~  j yields





















j 6= ?. Because any j 2 Dj(aj) is in the support of ~ j, (9) implies that, for all
j 2 Dj(aj) =  
 1
j (aj)\ supp 
j;









Second, consider any ^ aj = 2 supp ~ j: Then  
 1
j (^ aj)\ supp 
j = ?: In this case, Dj(^ aj) is a
singleton of   
 1
j (^ aj) 2  
j and (9) implies that








J;c] is an equilibrium relative to  , Vj(
j;




Therefore, (10) and (11) imply that ~ j is a best response for principal j when the other prin-
cipals use ~  j given a continuation equilibrium ~ c: Therefore, [~ 1;:::; ~ J;~ c] is an equilibrium
relative to A.
Now start with an equilibrium [~ 1;:::; ~ J;~ c] relative to A. Let ~ : 
 ! (E Y ) be the
social choice function that is supported by [~ 1;:::; ~ J;~ c]: Note that any incentive function
ak can be viewed as a degenerate menu k that assigns ak regardless of the menu that the
agent names. For principal j's deviation to mechanisms in  
j; one can associate c0; due to by
Lemma 1, with a continuation equilibrium strategy c0 :  
j A j 
 ! (Aj X) relative
to  
j  A j as follows. The probability distribution c0
aj(e;j;a j;!) on Aj satises, for all
aj 2 supp c0
aj(e;j;a j;!);
j(aj)(e) =  j(j)(e) (12)
9and the probability distribution c0
e(j;a j;!) on E satises
c
0
e(j;a j;!) = ~ c( j(j);a j;!): (13)
If principal j deviates to a menu j in  
j, his payo becomes
Vj(j; ~  j;c
0) = Vj( j(j); ~  j;~ c) (14)
because of (13). Because [~ 1;:::; ~ J;~ c] is an equilibrium relative to A and  j(j) 2 Aj; we
have
Vj(~ j; ~  j;~ c)  Vj( j(j); ~  j;~ c): (15)
Combining (14) and (15) yields Vj(~ j; ~  j;~ c)  Vj(j; ~  j;c0). Therefore, [~ 1;:::; ~ J;~ c] is
also an equilibrium relative to   and hence the social choice function ~ : 
 ! (E  Y )
continues to be supported.
References
[1] Attar, A., Majumdar D., Piaser G., and N. Porteiro (2008): \Common Agency Games:
Separable Preferences and Indierence," Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(1), 75-95.
[2] Pavan, A. and G. Calzolari (2010): \Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous
Common Agency Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(2), 132-190.
[3] Peck, J. (1997): \A Note on Competing Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle," Ohio
State University, mimeo.
[4] Peters, M. (2001): \Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, 69(5),
1349-1372.
[5] Peters, M. (2003): \Negotiations versus Take-it-or-leave-it in Common Agency," Journal
of Economic Theory, 111(1), 88-109.
[6] Peters, M. (2007): \Erratum to \Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency,
" Journal of Economic Theory, 135(1), 594-595.
[7] Peters, M. and C. Troncoso Valverde (2009): \A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechan-
sims," University of British Columbia, mimeo.
10